Automata Simulation of N-Person Social Dilemma Games.
               Vladimir Akimov,  Mikhail Soutchanski
     
Abstract.     
     Collective behavior of N players in a social dilemma game is
simulated  by  automata  exhibiting  asymptotically   cooperative
behavior.  In  his  automata  models of simple biological systems
M.Tsetlin  assumed  minimum  of  information  available  to   the
"players."  Our  automata were somewhat more sophisticated, using
Markov  strategies  in  their   interactions.   We   investigated
relationships  between  information  received by the automata and
the emergence of cooperation in a simulated evolution process. In
some ways our approach  is  similar  to  that  of  R.Axelrod.  It
differs  in  that  instead  of  determining the "most successful"
strategy, we  seek  surviving  strategies  in  a  social  dilemma
environment.   Previous   result  by  M.Soutchanski  showed  that
cooperation could be established asymptotically  under  partially
centralized  control.  In our model there is no such control. Our
main result is that more sophisticated behavior of "self-seeking"
automata compensates for the absence of  such  control.  Moreover
cooperation  is established more rapidly when more information is
available to the automata.

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Computer  and  Systems  Sciences,  1987,  v.25,  N3,  p.148-157
(name of the author was translated as Suchanskiy M.E.)
Tsetlin M.L.  "Automaton  theory  and  modeling  of  biological
systems".  (ser.  Mathematics  in  Science  and Engineering, v.
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