Automata Simulation of N-Person Social Dilemma Games. Vladimir Akimov, Mikhail Soutchanski Abstract. Collective behavior of N players in a social dilemma game is simulated by automata exhibiting asymptotically cooperative behavior. In his automata models of simple biological systems M.Tsetlin assumed minimum of information available to the "players." Our automata were somewhat more sophisticated, using Markov strategies in their interactions. We investigated relationships between information received by the automata and the emergence of cooperation in a simulated evolution process. In some ways our approach is similar to that of R.Axelrod. It differs in that instead of determining the "most successful" strategy, we seek surviving strategies in a social dilemma environment. Previous result by M.Soutchanski showed that cooperation could be established asymptotically under partially centralized control. In our model there is no such control. Our main result is that more sophisticated behavior of "self-seeking" automata compensates for the absence of such control. Moreover cooperation is established more rapidly when more information is available to the automata. Axelrod R. "The evolution of cooperation". Basic Books, 1984, N.Y. Soutchanski M.E. "Adaptive algorithm for determination of weakly efficient variant under randomness". In: Soviet J. of Computer and Systems Sciences, 1987, v.25, N3, p.148-157 (name of the author was translated as Suchanskiy M.E.) Tsetlin M.L. "Automaton theory and modeling of biological systems". (ser. Mathematics in Science and Engineering, v. 102), Academic Press, N.Y., 1973, 288p.